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Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements
SUMMARY
In recent years, the United States has
been unable to maintain an international con-
sensus for strict enforcement of all applicable
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq, but
it succeeded, at least partly, in preventing Iraq
from reemerging as a strategic threat to the
region.  During 1991-1998, despite Iraqi
obstructions, a U.N. Special Commission on
Iraq (UNSCOM) made considerable progress
in dismantling and monitoring of Iraqi mass
destruction weapons programs but was unable
to finish verifying Iraq’s claim that it has
destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction
or related equipment.  Iraq’s refusal of full
cooperation with UNSCOM eventually
prompted U.S.-British military action in De-
cember 1998; all inspectors withdrew, and Iraq
has been uninspected and unmonitored since.
On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq
accepted the U.N.-designated land border with
Kuwait, (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well
as Kuwaiti sovereignty.  Iraq has pledged to
live up to the requirement to help locate Ku-
waitis missing since the 1991 war, but there
has been very little progress on this issue over
the past few years, or on the return of Kuwaiti
property.  Iraq rejected a 1991 U.N.-spon-
sored “oil-for-food” program to address hu-
manitarian needs, but it later accepted a re-
vised version of that plan, which became
operational in December 1996.
Iraq’s compliance in other areas, espe-
cially human rights issues, is still unsatisfactory
to the international community.  A U.S.-led
no-fly zone has provided some protection to
Kurdish northern Iraq since April 1991.  Since
August 1992,  a no-fly zone has been enforced
over southern Iraq, where historically re-
pressed Iraqi Shiites are concentrated.  The
zone was expanded in 1996, but Iraq nonethe-
less maintains a substantial presence of ground
troops and security forces in the south.  Iraq
began openly challenging both no-fly zones in
late December 1998, and, since then, U.S.
aircraft have flown strike missions against Iraqi
air defense targets in response to over 700
Iraqi violations of the zones. 
In late 1998, the Clinton Administration
publicly added a major new dimension to U.S.
policy – openly promoting a change of regime
in Iraq. Accomplishing this additional U.S.
objective  is considered risky and difficult, and
not supported publicly by many other govern-
ments.   Statements and actions by Bush Ad-
ministration officials indicate they will build
largely on the policy framework on Iraq, but
they will also attempt to step up military con-
tainment and military sanctions.  However,
some Arab governments and several members
of the U.N. Security Council have begun to
openly back Iraq’s attempts to erode the
sanctions regime.  The opening of a  diplo-
matic dialogue with Baghdad (the United
States suspended relations with Iraq in January
1991) has not been under consideration, al-





On February 16, the United States and Britain conducted airstrikes on upgraded Iraqi
air defense networks just north of the southern no-fly zone, installations that were being
enhanced with help from Chinese firms.  During February 23-27, Secretary of State Powell
visited the Middle East, winning support for a U.S. plan to ease restrictions on exports to
Iraq of purely civilian technology in exchange for a regional crackdown on illicit trade with
Iraq.   U.N.-Iraq talks during February 26-27 on a possible restart of weapons inspections
resulted only in an agreement for further talks.  
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance from the end of the Gulf war
in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council maintained comprehensive
international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports.  The primary ceasefire resolution is 687
(April 3, 1991), requiring Iraq to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs,
recognize Kuwait and return Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti property, and end support for international
terrorism.  Iraq is required by Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991) to end repression of its people.
(See also CRS Report RL30472,  Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program; CRS Report 98-179, Iraq’s
Opposition Movements; CRS Report RL30728, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2000;
and CRS Report 98-386, Iraq: Post War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998.)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
A U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), chaired during July 1, 1997 - June 30, 1999
by Australian disarmament official Richard Butler (succeeding Rolf Ekeus), and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its
prohibited WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program to ensure that
Iraq remains free of WMD (Resolution 715, October 11, 1991).  The monitoring program,
accepted by Iraq in November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of
about 300 sites.  Under Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), UNSCOM conducted inspections
(at point of entry and at end-use destination) of  Iraqi imports of any dual use items.  
Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM
began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991),
which required unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD suppliers.
During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi security
service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights.   These actions
prompted  Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as on June
13, 1997) demanding Iraqi cooperation.   Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened travel
restrictions against Iraqi officials committing the infractions.  Resolution 1134 (October 23,
1997) again threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998.
(France, Russia, China, Egypt, and Kenya abstained.)  
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1997-1998 Crises.  Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM
personnel from conducting inspections and, on November 13, 1997, expelled the Americans.
Resolution 1137 (adopted unanimously November 12, 1997),  imposed travel restrictions on
Iraqi officials.  (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral
U.S. military action as a last resort.  The Senate did not act on a similar resolution,
S.Con.Res. 71, because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow
Saddam Husayn.)   In November 1997 and February 1998,  Russia and U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan, respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM
to resume full operations in Iraq.   The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for
access to eight “presidential sites” by a “special group” of UNSCOM inspectors and
diplomatic observers.   Security Council Resolution 1154 (March 2, 1998) accepted the U.N.-
Iraq agreement, threatening “the severest consequences” if Iraq reneged.   Iraq allowed
presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings) during March 26-April 3, 1998, and the United
States agreed to lift the travel ban on Iraqi officials and to resume sanctions reviews.
Cooperation again broke down when Iraq refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for
completing its work.  On August 5, 1998, Iraq barred UNSCOM from inspecting new
facilities, while permitting long-term monitoring.  The Senate and House passed a resolution,
S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998), declaring  Iraq in “material breach” of
the ceasefire.  On September 9, 1998, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1194, suspending sanctions reviews.  On October 30, 1998, the Security Council offered Iraq
a “comprehensive review” that offered to lift sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other
outstanding requirements, but Iraq demanded an immediate end to sanctions and ended
cooperation with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA).  The U.N. Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi action a  “flagrant violation”
of the February 1998 U.N.-Iraq  agreement.   On November 14, 1998, with the United States
about to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged to resume cooperation, narrowly averting U.S. air
strikes but prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of regime change.  
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath.  After a month of testing Iraq’s
cooperation,  UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMD-
related documents and that it was obstructing inspections, although the IAEA did not make
similar complaints.   All inspectors withdrew and the United States and Britain conducted a
70-hour bombing campaign (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998) against Iraqi
WMD-capable industrial facilities and military and security targets.  The United States
claimed success in degrading Iraq’s WMD production capabilities.
Lacking a consensus on how to restart inspections, in January 1999 the Security Council
established  three panels to review:  (1) WMD dismantlement; (2) the humanitarian situation;
and (3) missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti property.   Their recommendations formed the basis
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284  –  adopted December 17, 1999, by a vote of 11-
0 (Russia, France, China, and Malaysia abstained).   It formed a new WMD inspection body
(UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and offered to
“suspend” sanctions if Iraq  fully cooperated with UNMOVIC, although Iraq’s revenues
would remain subject to undefined “effective financial and operational controls.”  Exports of
dual use items to Iraq would require U.N. approval and arms exports would remain banned.
In January 2000, the Security Council agreed on former IAEA director Hans Blix to
head UNMOVIC.  His organizational plan was adopted on April 13, 2000, and he reported
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on August 28, 2000, that UNMOVIC was ready to begin preliminary activities in Iraq.
However, Iraq has refused to allow UNMOVIC to begin work in Iraq.   During February 26-
27, 2001, Iraq conducted talks with the U.N. Secretary General about restarting inspections,
but the talks yielded only an agreement to continue discussions in a few months.   In
conjunction with the talks, the Bush Administration as well as UNMOVIC said that resuming
inspection was a key goal, but that technical surveillance measures might be an acceptable
substitute, at least in the interim.  U.S. reports since 1999 note that Iraq is rebuilding facilities
capable of producing WMD, while adding that there is no hard evidence that Iraq is
reconstituting banned WMD programs at these facilities (see below).  
  
 The following sums up the status of disarmament efforts in Iraq and outstanding issues.
Nuclear Program
During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration that it had no nuclear weapons
facilities or unsafeguarded material, UNSCOM/IAEA uncovered and dismantled a previously-
undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research facilities, including three clandestine
uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic, centrifuge, and chemical isotope separation)
as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation program.  Inspectors found and dismantled
(in 1992) Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons development program, and they found evidence
of development of a radiological weapon, which scatters nuclear material without  an
explosion.  UNSCOM removed from Iraq all discovered nuclear reactor fuel, both fresh and
irradiated.  Following the defection of Husayn Kamil (Saddam’s son-in-law and former WMD
production czar) in August 1995, Iraq revealed it had launched a crash program in August
1990 to produce a nuclear weapon within one year, and that it had planned to divert fuel from
its reactors for a nuclear weapon. 
The IAEA, before it ceased work in Iraq, largely gave Iraq a “clean bill of health” on
nuclear issues and claimed to have uncovered most of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers.  A May 15,
1998 Security Council statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement  to close the nuclear file
if Iraq cleared up outstanding  issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of
some nuclear equipment).  However, the IAEA report of July 27, 1998 indicated that there
were still a few remaining questions, and the United States did not agree to close the file.  In
January 2000 and again in January 2001,  as part of Iraq’s commitments under the 1968
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium
remained sealed.   However, in May 2000, the IAEA destroyed an Iraqi nuclear centrifuge
that Iraq had stored in Jordan in 1991, and the IAEA said in an October 2000 report that the
absence of a robust inspections program left substantial uncertainty about Iraqi nuclear
activities.   The United States believes that Iraq retains the expertise (about 7,000 scientists
and engineers) and intends to rebuild its nuclear program.  
Chemical Weapons
UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel uncovered — 38,500 munitions, 690
tons of agents, 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces of  production equipment
items — and the destruction operation formally ended on June 14, 1994.  However, the fate
of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical
precursors, remains unknown.  Iraq refused to yield an Air Force document, found in July
1998 by UNSCOM, that could explain their fate, although Iraq allowed UNSCOM to take
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notes from it.  In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that shells taken from Iraq in 1996
contained 97% pure mustard gas, raising the possibility that it was freshly produced.
The primary remaining area of chemical weapons inquiry is production of VX nerve
agent, which Iraq did not include in its initial postwar declarations and of which no stockpile
was ever located.  By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to
force Iraq to admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had
imported enough precursor – about 600 tons – to produce 200 tons of the agent.  In late June
1998, UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army lab,
contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in stabilizing
the agent.  Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of VX.  About
170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring.  Iraq has not signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997.  Recent U.S. government reports to
Congress, including a Defense Department report in January 2001, have said Iraq has rebuilt
some commercial chemical plants that could be easily converted to chemical weapons
production.  A New York Times report of January 22, 2001 cited a resumption of production
at facilities that previously produced chemical and biological weapons, although the report
said there is no firm evidence that the plants’ products (pesticides, herbicides, and chlorine)
are being used for WMD.  
Biological Weapons
Iraq did not declare any biological materials, weapons, research, or facilities in its initial
declaration to UNSCOM in April 1991, and no biological stockpile was ever uncovered.
UNSCOM focused initially on the major research and development site at Salman Pak (gutted
and partially buried by Iraq shortly before the first inspection began) and later on the Al
Hakam facility south of Baghdad (dismantled by UNSCOM June 20, 1996).  In August 1991,
Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research program.  In July 1995, Iraq modified
its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive biological weapons program and that it
had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of  aflatoxin
and clostridium.  In August 1995, Iraq confessed to having produced 191 biological bombs,
of which  25 were missile warheads, loaded with anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin for use in
the Gulf war.  Iraq claims to have destroyed the bombs after the Gulf conflict.  UNSCOM
monitored 86 biological sites during 1994 - 1998. 
UNSCOM’s position was  that Iraq’s biological  declarations were not credible or
verifiable.  According to UNSCOM, Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for
producing biological agents during the 1980s, of which 4 tons remain unaccounted for.
UNSCOM still lacked information on Iraq’s development of drop tanks and aerosol
generators for biological dissemination, as well as the fate of the biological bombs noted
above.
Ballistic Missiles
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 requires the destruction of all Iraqi ballistic
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.  UNSCOM accounted for 817 of 819
Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, 130 of which survived the Gulf war, as well as all 14 declared
mobile launchers and 60 fixed launch pads.  U.S. and British analysts, contrary to
UNSCOM’s assessments, believe Iraq might be concealing 10 to 12 Russian-supplied Scud-
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type missiles.  UNSCOM’s last regular report (October 1998) said it had been able to account
for at least 43 of the 45 chemical and biological (CBW) warheads Iraq said it unilaterally
destroyed in 1991.  (The warheads were unearthed in mid-1998.)  An additional 30 chemical
warheads were previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.  UNSCOM also
accounted for all but 50 conventional Scud warheads, and said it had made progress toward
establishing a material balance for Scud engine components.  Unresolved issues include
accounting for missile program documentation, 300 tons of special missile propellant, and
indigenous missile production (30 indigenously-made warheads and 7 missiles).
In December 1995, after Jordan reported seizing 115 Russian-made missile guidance
components allegedly bound for Iraq, UNSCOM said Iraq had procured some missile
components since 1991, a clear violation of sanctions, and that it had covertly developed and
tested prohibited missiles.  (In December 1995, UNSCOM retrieved prohibited missile
guidance gyroscopes — suitable for a 2,000 mile range missile — from Iraq’s Tigris River,
apparently procured from persons with connections to Russia’s defense-industrial
establishment.)  UNSCOM also had evidence that Iraq, after the Gulf war, conducted secret
flight tests and conducted research on missiles of prohibited ranges.  Iraq is continuing to
develop permitted-range (under 150 km) missiles (Ababil and Samoud missile programs), and,
prior to Desert Fox, UNSCOM had been monitoring about 63 missile sites and 159 items of
equipment, as well as 2,000 permitted missiles.  U.S. military officials said after Desert Fox
that the bombing had set back Iraq’s missile program by two years, damaging short-range
missile production facilities including Taji, Ibn al-Haythim, Al Kindi, and Al Karama.
However, this assessment came under question when the  New York Times reported on July
1, 2000, that Iraq had resumed flight tests of the Samoud missile as of May 1999.
Humanitarian and Protective Efforts/Aid Programs
U.S. and U.N. human rights reports since the Gulf war have repeatedly described Iraq
as a gross violator of  human rights.  In 1994, the Administration said it might, at some point,
present a case against Iraq to the International Court of Justice under the 1948 Genocide
Convention.  U.N. Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der Stoel’s February 1994 report said that
Convention might be violated by Iraq’s abuses against the Shiite “Marsh Arabs” in southern
Iraq, including drainage of the marshes where they live.  (See CRS Report 94-320, Iraq:
Marsh Arabs and U.S. Policy)  In National Assembly elections on March 27, 2000, all 165
Ba’th Party candidates won (including Saddam’s elder son, Uday), as did 55 independents.
War Crimes Trial.   U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29, 1990) calls
on all states or organizations with substantiated information of Iraqi atrocities to provide such
information to the United Nations.  The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992,
(P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991, section 301) stated the sense of Congress that the President
should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal for Saddam Husayn.
H.Con.Res. 137, calling for the President to push for a war crimes tribunal for Saddam and
his associates, passed the House on November 13, 1997.  A similar resolution, S.Con.Res.
78, passed the Senate on March 13, 1998, and the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338) also
recommends a war crimes prosecution.
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, the U.S. Army conducted research into possible
war crimes; the report was  released on March 19, 1993, after Clinton took office.  Since
April 1997, the Administration has supported  INDICT, a non-governmental organization that
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publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the arrest of 12 alleged Iraqi war criminals.
Although apparently lacking international support, in August 2000, U.S. Ambassador-At-
Large for War Crimes David Scheffer said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war
crimes tribunal established within six months, focusing on  “nine major criminal episodes.” 
These include:  the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16,
1988, killing 5,000 Kurds) and the forced relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign
(February 1988, in which an estimated 50,000 to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical
weapons use against Iran; post-war crimes against humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh
Arabs); war crimes against Kuwait (oil fires, for example) and coalition forces; and other
allegations.    On December 1, 2000, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling
for an Iraq war crimes tribunal.  (For more information on funds appropriated to research and
publicize alleged Iraqi crimes, see CRS Report 98-179, Iraq’s Opposition Movements.)
U.N./U.S. Efforts in Iraq
The United States and United Nations are engaged in operations to provide humanitarian
relief to the Iraqi people and a measure of protection for Iraq’s Kurdish minority and other
objects of regime repression.
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW).   In April 1991, to protect the Kurds
in northern Iraq, the allied coalition set up a “no fly zone” north of the 36th parallel.  The no
fly zone enforcement operation (“Northern Watch”)  is in support of  – but not specifically
authorized by –  Resolution 688 and 687, the latter of which was passed under Chapter VII
(peace and security) of the U.N. Charter.   Humanitarian aspects of ONW were ended after
the September 1996 Iraqi incursion into northern Iraq, as was France’s participation in the
air patrols.   On December 17 2000, Turkey renewed for six months basing rights at Incirlik
Air Base for the 24 American aircraft and about 1,300 U.S. forces (plus allied forces).
However, Turkey fears that ONW protects the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
which takes refuge in parts of northern Iraq, and press reports in January 2001 indicated that
Turkey, which appointed an Ambassador to Iraq that month, might press the United States
to end ONW.  Turkey has made repeated attacks against the PKK there since May 1997.
The two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP led by Mas’ud Barzani and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, agreed in May 1992 to share power after
parliamentary and executive elections.  In May 1994, tensions between them flared into
clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for backing.   In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped
the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government.  With U.S. mediation, the
Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the establishment of a
400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens (75% of the force).  The
United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3 million for  peacekeeping  (Section
451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about $4 million in DoD drawdowns for vehicles and
communications gear (Section 552 of the FAA).   Also set up was a peace supervisory group
consisting of the United States, Britain, Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens.
A tenuous cease-fire has held since November 1997 and the KDP and PUK leaders signed an
agreement in Washington in September 1998 to work toward resolving the main outstanding
issues (sharing of revenues and control over the Kurdish regional government).   Despite
some progress and occasional meetings between the two party leaders, substantial tensions
remain.  Both parties are represented in the opposition umbrella Iraqi National Congress, but
both also maintain ties to Baghdad.  In mid-December 2000, Iraqi troops briefly took up
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positions just inside the Kurdish enclave, but did not launch an attack. (See CRS Report
96-739, Iraq: Attack on Kurdish Enclave and the U.S. Response.)  
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch.   Shiites constitute a majority in Iraq
but historically have been repressed.  The U.S.-led coalition declared a no-fly zone over
southern Iraq (south of the 32nd parallel) to protect the Shiites on August 26, 1992
(Operation Southern Watch), although the overflights primarily monitor the Iraqi military. 
The United States and the United Kingdom (but not France) expanded the zone up to the
33rd parallel on September 4, 1996, and France ended its participation entirely after  Desert
Fox.   In response to Iraq’s movement of troops toward Kuwait in October 1994, Security
Council Resolution 949 (October 15, 1994) demanded Iraq not deploy forces to threaten its
neighbors.   According to the U.S. and British interpretation, military action is authorized if
Iraq enhances (in numbers or quality of armament) its forces below the 32nd parallel.
Humanitarian Aid to the Iraqi People/”Oil-for-Food Program”
Although Iraq distorts the effect of international sanctions on its population, there is a
growing consensus in the international community and the United States to minimize  the
effect of sanctions on the Iraqi people.   Until September 1996, the United States  provided
humanitarian assistance to northern Iraq, and other donors channeled aid to the rest of Iraq
through the United Nations and  NGO’s.    Since then, the United States has relied on the
“oil-for-food” program (see below) to aid the Iraqi people, making occasional additional
contributions through international relief agencies.   Iraq has consistently failed to make the
required monthly statements to the U.N. or the IMF on its gold and foreign currency reserves.
Iraq claims not to have the hard currency to pay its dues to OPEC and the United Nations,
and it lost its General Assembly vote in 1994, but Resolution 1330 (December 5, 2000)
allows the drawdown of $15 million in oil-for-food revenues to bring Iraq’s U.N. dues
current.  Iraq owes $44 million in arrears to the IMF, but has never borrowed from it.
Prior to the “oil-for-food program,” funds for civilian goods and the implementation of
U.N. resolutions on Iraq were drawn from frozen Iraqi assets transferred — or direct
contributions — to a U.N. escrow account pursuant to Resolution 778 (October 1992).  Total
U.S. transfers to the escrow account, which matched contributions from other countries,
reached $200 million — the maximum required of any state under Resolution 778.  These
transfers were being repaid from proceeds of the oil-for-food program, although Resolutions
1284 and 1302 (June 8, 2000) suspended reimbursements until the end of 2000.   $173 million
is due back to the United States.  
U.N. “Oil-for-Food” Program.    The oil-for-food program, established by
Resolution 986 (April 15, 1995) but in operation only since December 1996, has been
progressively eased to try to alleviate human suffering.    However, Iraq is seeking to skirt the
programs’s restrictions in some cases.  On November 30, 2000, it ceased exporting oil when
the United Nations and oil purchasers refused to meet its demand that  purchasers pay 50
cents per barrel into a separate account that would be controlled by Iraq.   Iraq appeared
initially to back down from this demand, but there are continued reports that small oil trading
companies are paying Iraq these surcharges.   The United States and Britain have asked the
United Nations to prevent this payment by restricting the allowed buyers of Iraqi oil to
international energy companies that can be more easily monitored.   A New York Times report
of March 7, 2001 says Iraqi officials are demanding kickbacks in exchange for supply
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contracts.   Security Council Resolution 1330 provides a $540 million U.N.-supervised cash
component for the procurement in Iraq of oil industry repair and maintenance services, and
it adds electricity and housing supplies to the list of imports no longer subject to strict
Sanctions Committee scrutiny.   The resolution did not immediately approve Iraq’s request
to add transportation and telecommunications equipment to the “fast track approval” lists. 
In a March 2, 2001 report on the program, the Secretary General criticized Iraq for
insufficient procurement of medicine, children’s nutrition supplies, sanitation supplies, and
educational materials, as well as refusing to export as much oil as it is capable.  His report
also criticized the United States indirectly for placing “holds” on about $3 billion worth of
contracts for civilian infrastructure goods.  For a discussion of the oil-for-food program, see
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, updated November 29, 2000.)
Resettlement of Iraqi Refugees
Desert Storm and postwar rebellions against Saddam created a flood of Iraqi refugees,
including 39,000 Iraqis in a camp in Saudi Arabia (Rafha).  Of that pool, about 14,000 were
ex-soldiers (and their family members) that participated in postwar rebellions or had
surrendered to coalition forces.  The Bush Administration(1989-1993) agreed to participate
in a multinational resettlement recommended by UNHCR.  As of March 2000, total U.S.
admissions under the program were about 29,000 Iraqis, of which about 3,800 were ex-
soldiers and their families.  About 5,000 Iraqis remain in Saudi Arabia as refugees, and the
United States is not expected to resettle any more Iraqis.  The FY1994 defense authorization
(P.L. 103-160) stated the sense of the Senate that there be no admissions of Iraqi ex-soldiers
unless they are certified to have assisted coalition forces after defecting and have not
committed any war crimes; the Administration says these criteria have been met.  In the wake
of the September 1996 northern Iraq crisis, 5,900 Kurds who worked for U.S. relief
operations or U.S.-affiliated NGO’s in northern Iraq, as well as 650 opposition activists, were
resettled in the United States under the Attorney General’s parole authority.  (See CRS
Report 93-893, Iraq: Admission of Refugees into the United States.)
Iraqi Support for International Terrorism
Resolution 687 required Iraq to end support for international terrorism and Iraq made
a declaration to that effect to the U.N. Security Council.   However, it remains on the U.S.
list of state sponsors of terrorism and, according to the State Department’s April 2000 report
on international terrorism for 1999, continues to rebuild its terrorism network abroad.  (See
CRS Report RL30643, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2000.)
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Resolution 1284 requires reports on the issues discussed below.  However, in contrast
to Resolution 687, Resolution 1284 does not make the easing of any sanctions contingent
upon  Iraqi compliance on these Kuwait-related issues.
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Border Delineation and Security/Kuwaiti Sovereignty
Resolution 687 required Iraq to annul its annexation of Kuwait, directed the U.N.
Secretary-General to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border, and established a demilitarized zone
10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into Kuwait.   Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992)
endorsed border decisions taken by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission
(established May 2, 1991), and on November 23, 1992, the Commission finished demarcating
the Iraq-Kuwait border as described in an October 1963 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait.
The border took effect January 15, 1993.  The demarcation deprived Iraq of part of the port
of Umm Qasr and a strip of the Rumaylah oil field, which straddles the border.  On March 18,
1993, the Commission determined the sea border, allowing both countries access to the Gulf,
and its final report was accepted by the U.N. Secretary General on May 20, 1993.  Resolution
833 (May 27, 1993) demanded that Iraq and Kuwait accept the final border demarcation.  On
November 10, 1994, Iraq formally recognized Kuwait in a motion signed by Saddam Husayn,
but Iraqi officials routinely make statements that Kuwait interprets as threatening.  
The 32-nation U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established by
Resolutions 687 and 689 April 9, 1991), continues to monitor border violations.  The United
States contributes 11 personnel to the 197 observers in UNIKOM, which is commanded (as
of December 1, 1997) by an Irish officer and is considered a U.N. peacekeeping operation.
Under Resolution 806 (February 5, 1993), passed after  Iraqi incursions into the demilitarized
zone in January 1993 (and other incidents), a 908-member Bengali troop contingent
supplements the observer group.  Kuwait furnishes two thirds of UNIKOM’s $51 million
annual budget.  In FY2000, the United States contributed about $4.5 million to UNIKOM.
Return of Kuwaiti Missing Persons and Property
Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to account for Kuwaiti and other
nationals detained in Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis.  Of an initial 628 Kuwaiti cases, 608
are unresolved (ICRC figure as of May 2000), as are the cases of an additional 17 Saudi
nationals.  Iraq has admitted to having arrested and detained 126 Kuwaitis, but did not
provide enough information to resolve their fate.  Only three cases have been resolved since
1995.  Since January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait were meeting every month on the Iraq-Kuwait
border, along with U.S., British, French, and Saudi representatives, but Iraq stopped
attending the meetings after Operation Desert Fox.  In February 2000, retired Russian
diplomat Yuli Vorontsov was appointed to a new post (created by Resolution 1284) of U.N.
coordinator on the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and unreturned property.  Iraq has not
yet allowed him to visit to Iraq, and in April, June, and August 2000, the Security Council has
issued statements of concern about the lack of progress.  H.Con.Res. 275, passed by the
House on June 23, 2000, expressed the sense of Congress that the Administration should
exert pressure within the U.N. Security Council to focus on the issue, as well as on the fate
of U.S. airman Lt. Cdr. Michael Speicher, downed in Iraq the first day of the Gulf war.  
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to return all property seized
from Kuwait.   In the first few years after the cease-fire, Iraq returned some Kuwaiti civilian
and military equipment, including U.S.-made Improved Hawk air defense missiles.  However,
since 1994, U.S. officials have accused Iraq of returning to Kuwait some captured Iranian
equipment that was never part of Kuwait’s arsenal and of  using Kuwaiti missiles and armored
personnel carriers during Iraq’s October 1994 troop move toward the Kuwait border.  The
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United Nations says Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum
pieces, eight Mirage fighter aircraft, and other military equipment.  Iraq claims the materiel
was left behind or destroyed when Iraq evacuated Kuwait.  A June 2000 Secretary General
report and a June 19, 2000 Security Council statement did note that Iraq had returned “a
substantial amount of property.” 
Compensation Claims
The U.N. Security Council has set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 30% of  the
proceeds from Iraqi oil sales.  As of late January 2001, of a total asserted value of $320 billion
claims submitted, the Compensation Commission (UNCC) has thus far approved claims worth
about $32 billion.  Following a January 25, 2001 payout of $1.4 billion mostly to Kuwaiti
corporations and the Kuwaiti government, the UNCC has paid out about $11 billion and has
finished compensating claimants who suffered injuries or whose spouse, child, or parent died
as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  The Commission has paid some corporate and
governmental claims.  In September 2000, the UNCC governing council approved an award
to Kuwaiti of $15.9 billion for oil revenues lost because of the  Iraqi occupation and the
aftermath of the war (burning oil wells), although current payment schedules will provide only
a small fraction of that award (about $50 million) until 2003.  In exchange for Russian and
French approval of the claim, the United States  agreed to their proposal to reduce from 30%
to 25% the percentage of Iraqi oil revenues devoted to reparations, effective as of Phase Nine
of the oil-for-food program, as authorized by Resolution 1330.  In January 2001, the UNCC
took up Turkey’s claim for $1.25 billion in revenues lost as a result of the closure of the Iraq-
Turkey oil pipeline during 1990-1996.   
Legislation to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets (about $2.2 billion) in the United States
(separate from the U.N. compensation process) has not been enacted, leaving the Iraqi assets
still frozen.  In the 106th Congress, H.R. 618 (introduced February 8, 1999), provided for the
seizure of Iraq’s frozen assets in the United States and distribution to U.S. claimants, giving
priority to U.S. armed forces personnel.  H.R. 618 was incorporated into the House version
of H.R. 2415, the State Department authorization bill, but the provision was ultimately
dropped.  (See CRS Report 98-240,  Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues.)
U.S. Policy and Enforcement of Sanctions
As international sympathy for the plight of the Iraqi people has grown, the United States
has had increasing difficulty maintaining support for international sanctions, and U.S.
sanctions have been modified somewhat to align them with the oil-for-food program and
international sentiment.  Of the Security Council permanent members, the United States has
been the most reluctant to ease sanctions and has set the highest standards for full Iraqi
compliance.   The United States backed Resolution 1284, which provides incentive for Iraq
to fully cooperate with  UNMOVIC, in order to address the danger that Iraq can resume its
WMD programs if no inspectors are present.   The United States rules out dialogue with Iraq
on the grounds that Iraq’s level of  compliance does not justify direct talks.   In confirmation
hearings, Secretary  of State Colin Powell said on December 16, 2000 that the United States
needs to”re-energize” international sanctions on Iraq, but many believe he softened that
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stance during his February 2001 trip to the Middle East, in which he appeared to garner
regional support for a plan to facilitate exports of civilian equipment to Iraq in exchange for
regional pledges not to help Iraq conduct illicit trade.    In testimony before the House
International Relations Committee (March 7) and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(March 8), Secretary Powell said the policy amendments were necessary to rebuild regional
support for U.S. efforts to ensure no militarily useful technology reaches Iraq.   
Over the past few years, the differences within the Council on Iraq policy have
sharpened.  France, Russia, and China appear to believe that the U.S objective is to keep
sanctions on Iraq in order to promote regime change.  These and other countries have been
increasingly vocal in promoting an easing of Iraq sanctions, and they appear sympathetic to
Iraq’s charge that no amount of compliance will satisfy the United States, as long as Saddam
remains in power.  In February 2001, the Bush Administration protested to China about that
country’s apparent help in upgrading Iraq’s air defense network, which would constitute a
direct violation of U.N. sanctions.   On February 16, 2001, the United States and Britain
struck elements of  that network north of the southern no fly zone, in response to Iraq’s
increasing ability to target U.S. aircraft.   The strike received little support internationally. 
Since August 2000, French and Russian challenges to the U.S. interpretation that U.N.
Resolution 670 (September 25, 1990) bans passenger flights to and from Iraq has led to a
revival of significant air traffic into and from Iraq.  (The resolution bans flights carrying
“cargo,” except humanitarian cargo, subject to Sanctions Committee approval.)  Since then,
several dozen aircraft,  including some of Iraq’s erstwhile Gulf and other Arab enemies, have
flown officials, relief supplies, and even, in the case of one Jordanian flight, paying passengers
to Iraq.   On January 13, 2001, a flight chartered by a U.S. group flew to Iraq from Jordan,
in defiance of the restriction.  However, the vast majority of the  flights have conformed to
the existing practice of receiving formal Sanctions Committee clearance before taking off.
U.S. proposals that the flights be inspected to ensure that no prohibited technology or arms
are aboard have not yet met with agreement from France and Russia, which do not want to
give the United States a veto over each flight.  In early November 2000, Iraq restarted
passenger flights within Iraq and  its officials have begun flying directly to other countries.
The United States does not object to the internal flights, but it has asked Iraq to notify the
Sanctions Committee at least 48 hours in advance.  
Iraq is also trying to harness international business to its policy objectives.  In April
2000, two Canadian oil companies (Ranger and Occidental) set up offices in Iraq in hopes of
some day contracting to develop Iraqi oil fields; such investment is provided for by Resolution
1284 only after Iraq fully complies on outstanding WMD issues.  Iraq is pushing foreign
firms, especially those of Russia, Belarus, and India, to begin exploration work in Iraq before
sanctions are formally lifted.  Royal Dutch/Shell admitted in January 2001 that it is talking
with Iraq about a future exploration contract.  In mid-October 2000 Japan, which is always
looking to ensure steady supplies of energy, began rotating consular diplomats to its embassy
in Iraq in an apparent overture to Baghdad.    As a possible sign of Security Council easing
on this issue, and even though Resolution 1284 bars new exploration in Iraq for now, in
February 2001 the Sanctions Committee approved a Russian company (Zarubezhneft) plan
to drill 45 oil wells in northern Iraq.   Other similar proposals are still on hold.  
Formally, comprehensive U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq have been in place since
Iraq’s 1990 invasion (Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, Executive Order 12724 of
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August 6, 1990, and the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Section 586 of P.L. 101-513).  Since
then, U.S. trade regulations have been amended to align them with the oil-for-food program.
A summary of the regulations governing transactions with Iraq is provided in CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program.  U.S. imports of Iraqi oil soared in 1999 to about
700,000 barrels per day (about one third of Iraq’s oil exports), making Iraq the fifth largest
oil supplier to the United States in 1999, although imports have since fallen to less than
600,000 barrels per day as of October 2000.  On July 27, 2000, the Department of
Agriculture said that Iraq had bought its first shipment of U.S. rice (15,800 metric tons) since
1990.  A measure introduced in the 106th Congress on March 2, 2000 but not enacted (H.R.
3825), sought to ease civilian sanctions while preserving military sanctions, and would have
eased the licensing procedures for U.S. sales of goods to Iraq  under oil-for-food. 
As regional fears of Iraq have eased and sympathy for the Iraqi people has grown, the
United States has had difficulty persuading regional governments not to relax their
enforcement of sanctions on Iraq.  In some cases, neighboring governments seek direct
financial gain in helping Iraq.  Regional enforcement of sanctions is discussed below, and for
more information, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program.
Jordan.    Since 1992, and despite Jordan’s economic dependence on Iraq, the United
States has considered Jordan’s compliance with the U.N. sanctions regime on Iraq
satisfactory, even though  Jordan, under King Hussein and his successor, King Abdullah,
advocates U.S. engagement with Baghdad and has become increasingly vocal in advocating
easing of sanctions.    Recognizing Jordan’s economic need, the  Sanctions Committee “takes
note of” Jordan’s purchases of discounted Iraqi oil and oil products, which is exchanged for
Jordanian goods (approved under the oil-for-food program) and write-downs in Iraqi debt to
Jordan.  This relationship was renewed in November 2000  at a level of about $450 million
for the year, which translates into about 105,000 barrels per day of Iraqi oil exports to Jordan.
Every year since FY1994,  foreign aid appropriations laws (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, P.L.
104-107,  P.L. 104-208, P.L. 105-118, P.L. 105-277, P.L. 106-113, and P.L. 106-429), have
denied U.S. aid to any country that does not comply with the sanctions against Iraq, though
these laws do not mention Jordan specifically.   The Administration has routinely waived
sanctions in order to provide aid to Jordan, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East peace process,
and Congress has not objected to that waiver.  In October 2000, Jordan dismissed Lloyd’s
International from its role as inspector of goods bound for Iraq and arriving in Jordan at the
port of Aqaba, a role enshrined in an agreement between Jordan and the United States in
1993.   Since September 2000, Jordan has also become increasingly bold in sending flights
to Iraq, including those carrying relief supplies, officials, and even paying passengers
(November 30, 2000).  These recent actions could cause some U.S. complaints about
Jordan’s compliance with the Iraq sanctions, and Secretary of State Powell has pressed
Jordan not to proceed with a planned “free trade agreement” with Iraq that, some fear, could
increase the flow of unapproved civilian goods to Iraq.  (See CRS Issue Brief IB93085,
Jordan: U.S. Relations and  Bilateral Issues).
Turkey.  Turkey estimates that it has lost $35 billion as a result of the sanctions.  The
Turkish government, apparently with some degree of U.S. acquiescence, appears increasingly
cooperative with the illicit importation of about $200 million per year in Iraqi energy products
by Turkish truck drivers entering Iraq.  In April 2000, Iraq and Turkey neared agreement to
increase bilateral trade twelve fold, to about $2.5 billion per year, roughly pre-war levels.  
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Iran/Persian Gulf States/Smuggling.   In enforcing the embargo, two U.S. ships
lead a Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that conducts maritime searches in the Persian
Gulf to prevent the smuggling of oil and other high value exports.  The United States has
asserted that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has been helping Iraq smuggle out the oil exports
in exchange for “protection fees,” although Iran did stop some illicit shipments in March,
April, and again in late June 2000, earning some U.S. praise.  Despite these exceptions, Iran’s
cooperation helped Iraq’s illicit exportation reach a high in mid-2000 of about $80 million per
month, and Iraq reportedly earned a net of about $600 million for all of 2000, according to
British military officials.   It should be noted that Iraq receives only half the export value after
paying off Iranian Revolutionary Guards and smugglers.  Iraq openly stated in July 2000 that
it will continue to export “extra” (smuggled) oil products.
Iranian-Iraqi relations have improved since 1995, including talks between Iraq’s Vice
President and Iranian President Mohammad Khatemi at the margins of the summit in Tehran
(December 9-11, 1997) of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).  The two
exchanged 6,000 prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war in April 1998 and have been exchanging
smaller numbers of prisoners since.  In early October 2000, the two agreed to abide by the
1975 Algiers Accords that delineated their border, and Iran’s Foreign Minister visited later
in the month, a sign of accelerating rapprochement.   Regarding Iraq’s relations with the Gulf
monarchy states, in April 2000, the UAE and Bahrain reopened embassies in Baghdad,
leaving Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as the only two Gulf monarchies without relations with Iraq.
Saudi Arabia has requested Sanctions Committee permission to open a border crossing with
Iraq that will help expand Saudi exports to Iraq from $200 million in 2000 to about $600
million in 2001.  In November 2000, the United States imposed restrictions on U.S. trade
with a Qatari royal family member who donated to Iraq a 747 aircraft from a small air service
he runs.   Kuwait has expressed support for Secretary Powell’s proposals on Iraq sanctions.
Syria/Lebanon/Egypt.  Syria and Iraq began a warming trend in relations by
reopening their border in 1997; this trend has continued since the July 2000 accession of
Bashar Assad to the presidency of Syria.    In July 1998, the two countries announced a plan
to reopen the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, closed since 1982, and energy industry reports since
November 2000 say Iraq has begun sending about 150,000 barrels per day of oil through the
line, under a bilateral “swap” arrangement in which Syria uses the oil domestically and exports
an equivalent extra amount of its own oil.  Because of discounts offered to Syria for the oil,
Iraq earns about $2 million per day from this illicit exportation, skirting the oil-for-food
program.   Resolution 1284 (paragraph 16) lays the groundwork for the opening of this route,
but the necessary U.N. approvals and monitoring are not in place.   Secretary of State Powell
said after visiting Syria in February 2001 that Syrian President Bashar Assad had committed
to placing the pipeline under oil-for-food guidelines, but doing so appears to require Iraqi
concurrence and Iraq subsequently said that a new oil-for-food export route is “not a
priority.”    Iraqi-Syrian political relations have warmed to some extent as well, and Iraqi
diplomats visited Damascus in February 2000 to staff a new Iraqi interest section there.  In
August 2000, Iraq resumed rail service to Syria, suspended since 1982, and in October 2000
the two announced that Iraqi Airways would reopen an office in Damascus.  The two
countries also have announced plans to double their trade from the current level of about
$450 million per year, and they have signed a “free trade” agreement.  
Lebanon, which is under the heavy influence of Syria, restored diplomatic relations with
Iraq  October 23, 1998, after a 4-year break, and might eventually import oil from a branch
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of the Iraq-Syria pipeline.  As a sign of warming Iraqi-Egyptian relations, Iraqi-Egyptian trade
under the oil for food program has now reached $800 million annually, and the two agreed
in September 2000 to increase that to $1 billion.  On January 18, 2001, the two countries
signed a “free trade agreement,”although under the condition that it goes into effect when
sanctions are lifted.  In November 2000, Iraq and Egypt upgraded relations by converting
their interest sections into embassies.
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
After repeated crises with Iraq, the Clinton Administration stated in November 1998 that
U.S. policy is to work toward establishing a new regime in Iraq, although the opposition is
fragmented and weak.  The Bush Administration has reiterated that as a desirable goal, but
it is still unclear to what degree the Administration will act toward that end.   The FY2001
foreign aid appropriations, P.L. 106-429, provides $25 million in Economic Support Funds
for programs “benefitting the Iraqi people,” of which at least $12 million is to be used by the
INC to distribute humanitarian aid inside Iraq, $6 million is for INC broadcasting, and $2
million is for Iraqi war crimes research and publicity.   In early September 2000, the Clinton
Administration told Congress it would provide $4 million of the $8 million in FY2000 ESF
as a direct grant to the INC for media operations, humanitarian relief, and training in
“protective skills,” to prepare for the delivery of humanitarian aid inside Iraq.  On February
2, 2001, the Bush Administration said it was releasing the $4 million for INC information
gathering inside Iraq and continuing to discuss how the INC will distribute humanitarian aid
in Iraq.  Some believe the INC humanitarian relief plan entails high risks and could cause
Baghdad to lash out at INC aid recipients and neighboring governments.  For discussion of
the U.S. regime change policy, including the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338), see CRS
Report 98-179, Iraq’s Opposition Movements.
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
The Clinton Administration’s position was that military action against Iraq could be
taken if Iraq: is known to have rebuilt WMD; threatens its neighbors; or attacks the Kurdish
enclave.   Early indications are that Bush Administration criteria for military action will differ
little, if at all.   However, the February 16, 2001 airstrike north of  the southern no fly zone
(although aircraft did not venture beyond the zone) might indicate that the Bush
Administration will focus more on military containment than did its predecessor.   The strikes
were deemed relatively successful, but Iraq resumed tracking U.S. and British patrols
thereafter, suggesting the Iraqi air defense network was not crippled.   Press reports after the
strike indicated that Chinese firms were helping Iraq upgrade that network.   Following U.S.
intercession with China, China told the United States it had ordered its firms to discontinue
any such work in Iraq.
The allied coalition invokes U.N. Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990, authorizing use
of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait),  687 (the main ceasefire resolution), 688 (human rights),
and the Safwan Accords — the March 3, 1991 cease-fire agreements between Iraq and the
coalition forces that banned Iraqi interference with allied air operations — to enforce the
no-fly  zones over northern and southern Iraq.  In instances of strikes on Iraq, the
Administration also has cited congressional action (primarily P.L. 102-1 of  January 12, 1991
authorizing military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait).  Resolutions 678 and 687 were written
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, dealing with peace and security, and are interpreted
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as allowing military action to enforce these resolution.  Resolution 688 (human rights) was
not written under Chapter VII, however.  To justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration
cited additional justification from Resolution 1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest
consequences” for non-compliance.  Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense
Authorization Act for FY1992, signed December 5, 1991, expressed Congress’ support for
“all necessary means” to achieve the goals of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687.  (For
information on the U.S. military posture in the Gulf tasked with containing Iraq, see CRS
Report RL30728, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2000.)  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
the United Arab Emirates contributed a total of $37 billion to the $61.1 billion in incremental
costs of Desert Storm, all of which has been paid.  
Costs.  From the end of the Gulf war until the end of FY2000, the Defense Department
has incurred about $8 billion in costs to contain Iraq and provide humanitarian aid to the
Kurds.  Of that, about $1.14 billion was spent in FY2000, and just under $100 million was
spent for Operation Desert Fox.   The Clinton Administration estimated that $1.1 billion
would be spent in FY2001, and an FY2001 defense appropriation (H.R. 4576, P.L. 106-259,
signed August 9, 2000) provided $3.938 billion in emergency spending for operations over
Iraq and in Bosnia and Kosovo.)   In addition, the Department of Defense, under the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a),  assisted UNSCOM
by providing U-2 surveillance flights (suspended since the December 15, 1998 UNSCOM
pullout), intelligence, personnel, equipment, and logistical support.  This support cost the
United States about $15 million per year, the amount authorized for FY2000 (DoD
authorization law, P.L. 106-65).  (See CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping: Issues of
U.S. Military Involvement.)
